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1. Introduction 
 
The idea that workers should be compensated for a number of adverse working 
conditions is almost as old as the profession of economics itself. This perspective on 
the functioning of labour markets originates from the writings of Adam Smith and 
was later formulated as the theory of compensating wage differentials (see e.g. Brown 
1980; Rosen 1986; Dorman 1996). The theory states that workers receive wage 
premia related to harms and hazards at their workplace and utilities of workers are 
therefore equalised between industries and occupations by means of competition in 
the labour market. In particular, the theory implies that the marginal worker receives a 
compensated wage just enough to accept the work conditions, whereas those who are 
not risk averse or do not mind adverse conditions are paid more than is necessary to 
have them work in jobs that are risky or have bad working conditions.  
 
Empirical studies on compensating wage differentials have applied several different 
measures for job disamenities. An extensive literature exists on the wage effects of 
work-related accidents, for example, based on industry-level or occupation-level 
aggregates (see Viscusi and Aldy 2003, for a survey). Another branch of the literature 
focuses on adverse working conditions from a broader perspective, including physical 
demands, noise, dirtiness, etc. by using hedonic wage equations (see e.g. Brown 
1980). In recent research, for example, job stress (French and Dunlap 1998), flexible 
working hours (Gariety and Shaffer 2001), shift work (Lanfranchi, Ohlsson and Skalli 
2002), and perception of job instability, measured by product market volatility 
(Magnani 2002), among other factors, have been investigated.  
 
Overall, the evidence is fairly mixed. Perhaps the clearest result in this field of 
research is that the risk of death at the workplace has some positive influence on 
individual wages (see e.g. Viscusi and Aldy 2003), but there is some empirical 
evidence that shows that compensating wage differentials are also related to other job 
disamenities. In addition, there is evidence of compensating wage differentials from a 
number of countries that have different institutional frameworks for labour markets. 
On the other hand, there are several empirical studies that do not support the 
hypothesis of compensating wage differentials. For example, Brown (1980) used 
longitudinal data in order to control for more worker characteristics than had been 
 2
common in the earlier literature. The omitted-variable bias has been a serious problem 
in most of the empirical studies that have tried to estimate the magnitude of 
compensating wage differentials. Even with this approach, the coefficients of various 
adverse job characteristics were often wrong-signed and insignificant in the wage 
equations.  
 
There have been studies that aim to provide alternative explanations for wage 
differentials across industries and occupations that may explain the rejections of the 
hypothesis of compensation differentials. In this respect, Dorman and Hagstrom 
(1998) stress that the non-competitive aspects of wage formation are very important in 
terms of compensating wage differentials. This means that the estimated wage 
equation should include a number of industry-level controls (such as profitability and 
capital/labour ratio) or, alternatively, a full set of dummies attached to industries. 
They discover that the inclusion of industry-level controls largely wipes out the 
compensating wage differentials that have been discovered in the literature. This 
pattern is consistent with the dominance of non-competitive wage formation in the 
labour market.  
 
Other econometric issues that may be essential for observing compensating wage 
differentials include the selectivity of workers into risky workplaces and the 
endogeneity of work conditions (e.g. Sandy and Elliott 1996, Daniel and Sofer 1998, 
Wei 1999, Arabsheibani and Marin 2001). The reason is that more dangerous jobs 
tend to be chosen by those workers who are less averse to dangers at the workplace. 
This implies that the OLS estimates of job disamenities based on the wage equation 
may be downwards biased.1  
 
There are theoretical reasons for expecting that adverse working conditions may not 
be reflected in wages. Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998) and Lang and Majumdar 
(2003) obtain this conclusion by constructing search models in which jobs vary with 
respect to non-pecuniary characteristics. The equilibrium distribution of wage and job 
characteristic combinations need not show evidence of compensating wage 
differentials. In addition, Manning (2003) strongly argues that utilities of workers are 
not equalised between industries and occupations in the labour market characterized 
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by frictions and monopsony power by employers. Frictions in worker mobility can 
prevent the market for disamenities from reaching equilibrium.  
 
The large literature on job disamenities has almost solely focused on pecuniary 
rewards for adverse working conditions. However, there is an emerging empirical 
literature that aims at understanding the determination of overall job satisfaction in 
relation to adverse working conditions. This interest has, for the most part, arisen 
owing to inconsistencies in the results of earlier studies and enduring scepticism 
regarding the existence of competitive labour markets and compensating wage 
differentials.  
 
The level of job satisfaction reported by workers may, indeed, have been affected by 
various job disamenities. This pattern has been disclosed in several recent studies.2 
Godechot and Gurgand (2000) investigate the determination of individual wages and 
job satisfaction in France. Their results indicate that adverse working conditions tend 
to have some negative effect on job satisfaction. For instance, workers that fail to 
have enough opportunities for breaks report a lower level of job satisfaction, but they 
do not get higher wages as a compensation for their adverse working conditions. 
Webster and Bainger (2001) focus on the non-pecuniary aspect of job choice by 
applying International Social Science Surveys for Australia. They discover that non-
pecuniary aspects are important in job choice, for instance, for women with children 
under 18 years of age. Kawaguchi (2002) reports, based on the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY), that self-employed persons are more satisfied, which can be 
understood as a compensation for their lower income. Lalive (2002) investigates the 
determination of individual wages and job satisfaction by using NLSY. The results 
show that wage differentials do not exclusively compensate for work conditions. By 
using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study Stutzer and Frey (2003) document 
that commuters report a lower level of subjective well-being, but they do not get 
higher wages in response to this, other things being equal. Finally, Clark (2003) puts 
forward the argument based on the British Household Panel Survey that high-paying 
occupations are also high satisfaction occupations. This observation is inconsistent 
with the existence of compensating wage differentials in the labour market. In 
addition to these studies, there is research where the worker’s level of job satisfaction 
is inferred indirectly e.g. through the probability of switching industries. Herzog and 
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Schlottmann (1990) compare the coefficients of the wage equation and the job change 
equation in order to learn insights about the extent of compensating wage differentials 
for job risks in the U.S. manufacturing industries. 
 
This empirical study contributes to the literature on compensating wage differentials 
and job satisfaction in three ways. First, there are no earlier estimates available about 
the existence and the magnitude of the compensating wage differentials in the Finnish 
labour market.3 The Finnish case is interesting, because the binding collective labour 
agreements already contain some compensation for adverse working conditions. In 
particular, the collective labour agreements contain pecuniary compensations for 
uncomfortable working hours. For instance, there are specific compensations for the 
3-shift workers. However, the collective agreements put only an effective floor to 
wage levels in particular occupations (or jobs). There is no upper limit for wages as 
such. In addition, the collective labour agreements adjust quite slowly to take into 
account the changes in general working conditions and they cannot account for all 
specific working conditions in different firms. In other words, the heterogeneity of 
workplaces makes it hard for collective agreements to take into account all the 
relevant aspects of working conditions that may matter for individual workers. 
Therefore, there is still room for additional monetary compensation, because workers’ 
subjective valuations about their working conditions can differ greatly from the ones 
that have been stipulated in the collective agreements by the central organizations of 
employees and employers. 
 
Second, the Finnish data make it possible to investigate the impact of a broad range of 
working conditions on individual wages and overall job satisfaction. Most of the 
earlier empirical studies on compensating wage differentials and job satisfaction have 
used only a very limited set of variables that are used to describe work disamenities. 
Moreover, the high unemployment rate (12.7 per cent in 1997, the year of our data) 
may constitute an obstacle to the formation of compensating wage differentials by 
reducing the bargaining power of individual workers in the labour market. In 
particular, this makes it more likely that workers report a lower level of overall job 
satisfaction in jobs with adverse characteristics.  
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Third, in addition to overall job satisfaction, we investigate an alternative, indirect 
measure of satisfaction by considering the potential influence of adverse working 
conditions on self-reported fairness of pay. Recently, fairness standards have been 
stressed in a number of studies on labour markets (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2000), but 
these issues have not often been related to the literature on job disamenities. In this 
respect, consideration of fairness of pay completes the picture painted by adverse 
working conditions on workers’ satisfaction. 
 
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 contains considerations on an empirical 
strategy to test compensating wage differentials. Section 3 provides a description of 
the data and Section 4 contains the estimation results for wage equations and job 
satisfaction equations (including an alternative, indirect measure for satisfaction based 
on fairness of pay). Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Empirical strategy 
 
We discuss here some approaches for testing compensating wage differentials that do 
not rely solely on the estimation of a hedonic wage equation, but also apply 
information on job satisfaction. Assume that the utility of an individual depends on 
wage4 and working conditions: U = U(w,D), where w is wage and D a vector of 
measures of disamenities related to work; it is assumed that ∂U/∂w = Uw > 0 and 
∂U/∂Di = UDi < 0 for all disamenities i. On the other hand, if the disamenities are 
compensated in the form of higher wages, we have w = w(X,D) with ∂w/∂Di = wDi > 
0 for all i. The vector X includes all other determinants of wages, such as education 
and experience. Inserting the wage equation in the utility function gives U = 
U(w(D,X),D). Full compensation of disamenities implies that, in the margin, the 
working conditions do not affect utility, i.e. dU = UwwDidDi + UDidDi = 0, for all i. 
This finally gives wDi = -UDi/Uw. That is, the marginal compensation of an adverse 
working condition in terms of wage has to equal the marginal rate of substitution of 
wage and the particular disamenity. In a competitive labour market, would also be the 
trade-off in terms of firms’ profits between wage and working conditions would be 
equal to the slope of the wage equation.  
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Empirically, the analysis of compensating wage differentials proceeds by estimating a 
standard wage equation with the usual control variables X. The model is augmented 
with variables that capture, in broad terms, the workers’ subjective views about the 
factors of harms and hazards in their current working conditions. Most of the 
literature on compensating wage differentials has tested their existence on the basis of 
this kind of hedonic wage equations. However, the estimates of the effects of 
disamenities on wages give the marginal rate of substitution between wages and 
disamenities only for those workers and firms that have chosen that particular level of 
disamenities (see e.g. Rosen 1986).  
 
To test whether the marginal rates of substitution are, in fact, equal to the slope of the 
wage equation, we estimate another equation that measures in some way the utility 
derived from wage and disutility caused by the disamenities. Based on the estimated 
parameters of these equations, it is possible to make conclusions on whether adverse 
working conditions are compensated either by the collective labour agreements or by 
firm-level wage formation.  
 
Measurement of utility is by no means a trivial task. A natural alternative is overall 
job satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) (e.g. Clark 2003). It is typical feature of workplace 
surveys that job satisfaction is expressed in an ordinal scale with a few (often 3-5) 
alternatives. This is also the case with the data that we are using. This kind of data 
calls for modelling the utility equation using ordered probit or logit estimation. 
Although the variable to be explained is not continuous and, hence, the coefficients 
cannot be directly compared with those from the estimation of an equation for a 
continuous wage, the test of compensating wage differentials requires only the ratio of 
the coefficients of wage and a disamenity. Naturally, econometric issues like 
selectivity may have to be dealt with. Note that if dissatisfaction rather than 
satisfaction is measured, the signs of the derivatives above are reversed, i.e. UDi > 0 
and Uw < 0. 
 
The nature of wage formation can further be evaluated by taking advantage of 
information about workers’ perception about the fairness of pay. This constitutes a 
direct measure of utility derived from wage. Again, this is available as an ordinal 
variable. As still another alternative, we could use quit intentions on the grounds that 
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lower quit intentions imply higher satisfaction with the current job. Herzog and 
Schlottman (1990) use this approach for comparing wage and indifference curve 
slopes and Gronberg and Reed (1994) estimate the marginal willingness to pay for job 
attributes by taking the ratio of the coefficients of job disamenities and wage in a job 
duration model. 
 
To interpret the test, consider first the case that adverse working conditions have no or 
only a small impact on individual wages, but have an adverse impact on the level of 
job satisfaction and the perception about the fairness of pay (and, in addition, wage 
yields positive job or pay satisfaction), i.e. 0 ≤ wDi < -UDi/Uw. Then the conclusion is 
that adverse working conditions are not sufficiently compensated in terms of higher 
wages. In other words, workers’ inherent aspirations for higher wages in adverse 
working conditions are not transformed into higher actual wages.  
 
It is possible that adverse working conditions have no impact on wages or the level of 
job satisfaction, wDi = -UDi/Uw = 0. Then it can be concluded that adverse working 
conditions are not such a factor that should be compensated in the labour market. If 
adverse working conditions may have an impact on individual wages, but not at all or 
only little on the level of job satisfaction, wDi ≥ -UDi/Uw ≥ 0. This would imply 
overcompensation for adverse working conditions. Finally, equality wDi = -UDi/Uw is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the wage formation fully takes into account 
adverse working conditions and the marginal rates of substitution between wage and 
working conditions are therefore equalised in the labour market, as stated by the 
theory of compensating wage differentials.  
 
There are alternative ways of testing for compensating wage differentials. If utility 
depends on wage and disamenities, and wage fully reflects compensation for the 
working conditions, then inserting the implied wage in the utility function should 
wipe out the disamenities, but also the wage. This is easily demonstrated in the linear 
case U = α + βD + δw + Xγ and w = θ + φD + Zρ, where U is measured by job 
satisfaction and X and Z denote all other variables. Compensating wage differentials 
implies that φ = - β/δ. Applying this in the wage equation and inserting the wage 
equation into the utility function gives U = α + δθ + Xγ + Zρδ. Then a test of the 
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compensating wage differentials would be a test of whether the hypothesis β* = 0 
holds in the job satisfaction equation U = α* + β*D + Xγ + Zρ*, where wage is not 
included. This is the testing strategy employed by Godehot and Gurgand (2000) and 
Stutzer and Frey (2003). Compensating wage differentials can also be tested by 
testing the hypothesis δ = 0 in the job satisfaction equation U = α* + δ*w + Xγ + Zρ* 
where disamenities are not included. This test is applied by Lalive (2002). Clark 
(2003) also uses an approach that is based on the above simple model. He explains 
both job satisfaction and wages with occupation dummies. A difficulty with these 
tests is that in the case of multiple work-related harms and hazards, it has to be 
assumed that compensating wage differentials apply to all of them at the same time. 
 
If there are no variables that can be used as proxies for utility, it is possible to test the 
predictions of compensating wage differentials by estimating the wage equation and 
an equation that is derived from the optimization condition for utility maximization. 
Their slopes should be the same if the hypothesis of compensating wage differentials 
holds. This approach is discussed, for example, in Viscusi (1993). Finally, if the 
purpose is not to test for compensating wage differentials but rather to assess their 
magnitude, the use of the optimization condition is possible. Alternatively, if job 
satisfaction data is available, one can estimate the model with wage included and 
indicators for workers in different kinds of working conditions. The monetary value 
of disamenities (or amenities) can then be assessed from the coefficients. Kawagushi 
(2002) uses this method for analyzing the amenity value of being self-employed, 
compared with salary earners. 
 
3. Data 
 
The data set that we are using in this study is the Quality of Work Life Survey 
(QWLS) of Statistics Finland. It is conducted at irregular intervals, the latest being 
from 1997, which is the year that we use. The initial sample for QWLS is derived 
from a monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS) of Statistics Finland, where a random 
sample of the working age population is selected for a telephone interview. The 1997 
QWLS was based on LFS respondents in September and October who were 15-64 
year old wage and salary earners with a normal weekly working time of at least five 
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hours. 3795 individuals were selected for the QWLS sample and invited to participate 
in a personal face-to-face interview. Out of this sample, 2978 persons, or around 78 
per cent, participated (see Lehto and Sutela 1999). Owing to missing information on 
some variables for some workers, the sample size used in estimations varies by 
equation and is around 2750 observations.  
 
For our research, a major strength of the QWLS survey is that it contains a number of 
questions about the subjective views of workers with respect to their working 
conditions (including factors of perceived harms and hazards in broad terms).5 This 
means that the QWLS survey is highly suitable for the investigation of compensating 
wage differentials in the Finnish labour market. The survey also contains information 
about the level of overall job satisfaction, considerations for fairness of pay and 
notions about the promotion prospects, among many other things. In addition, QWLS 
includes a number of questions on the personal characteristics and work experience of 
the respondents that can be used as control variables. 
 
Statistics Finland supplements QWLS with information from the LFS on, for 
example, working time and exact labour market status. Supplementary information on 
the industry and location of the employer, and on the level and field of education of 
the respondents, is gathered from various registers maintained by Statistics Finland. 
The variables that we are using are described in detail in Appendix 1, and Appendix 2 
reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables included. 
 
We have two alternative measures for wages. The first, WAGE, is the logarithm of 
hourly earnings that have been calculated from annual taxable earnings obtained from 
tax registers divided by annual hours, which, in turn, are based on regular weekly 
hours from LFS. An alternative measure, WAGECAT, is based on self-reported 
monthly wage groups. The variable is the logarithm of the lower limit of the groups.  
 
We measure job dissatisfaction with the variable DISSATISFACTION, which is an 
ordered discrete variable with 4 categories, 1: very satisfied (the number of 
observations in this category is 880), 2: quite satisfied (1813), 3: rather dissatisfied 
(152), and 4: very dissatisfied (29). Since this measures disutility, the signs of UD and 
wD as discussed in section 2 are reversed. As an alternative dissatisfaction measure we 
 10
use the PAYUNFAIR variable, which is an ordered discrete variable with 5 
categories, 1: the wage is clearly higher than it should be (the number of observations 
in this category is 8), 2: the wage is somewhat higher than it should be (53), 3: wage 
is about right (1269), 4: the wage is somewhat lower than it should be (1055), and 5: 
the wage is clearly lower than it should be (543). As expected, there are only a few 
observations in the first categories.  
 
This study takes a different angle from that of most of the earlier literature, because 
the empirical investigation of compensating wage differentials and the level of job 
satisfaction is based on an application of the subjective valuation of adverse working 
conditions that are related to wages and job satisfaction at the unit of analysis. Indeed, 
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) in their survey of the literature on compensating wage 
differentials point out that very few empirical studies have actually compiled workers’ 
subjective perceptions regarding risks at the workplaces. For instance, Clark (2003) 
uses occupation dummies to pick out the job disamenities faced by British workers.  
 
The subjective valuations of harms and hazards related to working conditions are 
measured in the QWLS survey by the use of different categories. For perceived 
harms, there is a five-point scale in which the highest category corresponds to the 
perception by the worker that a feature of working conditions is ‘very much’ an 
adverse factor at the workplace. For perceived hazards, the highest category among 
three possibilities is the one in which the respondent considers a feature at the 
workplace ‘a distinct hazard’. Responses to the questions about adverse working 
conditions can be aggregated by forming a dummy variable that equals one if there is 
at least one clearly adverse factor (HARM) and a dummy that equals one if there is at 
least one distinct hazard (HAZARD). These variables capture different aspects at 
Finnish workplaces, as implied by the relative small correlation of 0.31 that prevails 
between these two key variables that are used to describe adverse working conditions.  
 
We use the following dummy variables as other job disamenities. UNCERTAINTY 
tells us that there is at least one clear insecurity factor at the workplace, NOVOICE 
implies that there is at least one aspect of the work that the worker cannot influence at 
all, NEGLECT is a dummy for the existence of at least one aspect where the worker 
gets no support from superiors, ATMOSPHERE tells us that the worker experiences 
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at least one negative aspect in the work atmosphere almost daily, and CONFLICTS is 
a dummy for at least one type of conflict often experienced often at the workplace. 
Additionally, we have dummy variables for the difficulty of taking breaks 
(NOBREAK), for working mostly outdoors (OUTDOORS), and physically or 
mentally very demanding work (HEAVYPHYSIC and HEAVYMENTAL, 
respectively). 
 
We include a large set of control variables. There are typical human capital variables 
that are sex (FEMALE), age (dummies AGE_1 to AGE_3), union membership 
(UNION), marital status (SINGLE), a dummy for a working spouse 
(SPOUSEWORK), number of children (CHILDREN), level of education (dummies 
EDU_1 to EDU_4), and field of education (dummies EDUHUM, EDUBUS, 
EDUTECH, EDUCARE). In addition, we include variables that capture the 
occupation and job switches (OVER1PROFS and SWITCHES, respectively), the 
unemployment history of a worker (dummies UMOS_1 to UMOS_4), tenure 
(TENURE and TENURE2) and a dummy for second job holders (SECONDJOB). 
  
There are dummy variables that describe the payment system (FIXEDPAY, 
PIECERATE) and dummies for working time related aspects of work, like temporary 
contract (TEMPORARY), part-time work (PART_TIME), night work (NIGHT), shift 
work (SHIFT), weekend work (WEEKEND), and overtime almost daily 
(MUCHOVERTIME). Other dummies give an indication of the use of computers 
(MUCHCOMPUTER), poor advancement opportunities (NOPROMOTION), 
discrimination at the workplace (DISCRIMINATION), teamwork (HIGHTEAM), 
team-related problems (TEAMPROBLEM), and managerial tasks (MANAGER). On-
the-job training is measured by the number of days in training (DAYSTRAINING). 
 
There is some information available on the health of the worker, especially, number 
of absences (SICKABSENCE) and self-assessment of work capacity (CONDITION, 
on a scale 0 to 10). Information on the employer includes dummies for the public 
sector and foreign private owners (PUBLIC, FIRMFOREIGN), and plant size group 
(dummies PSIZE_1 to PSIZE_4), and a dummy for employment growth 
(EMPGROWTH), unstable financial situation (FIRMUNSTABLE), and a high share 
of female workers (FEMSHARE). Finally, we include industry dummies (14 
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industries), occupation dummies (81 occupations), and the regional unemployment 
rate (UN) for capturing the possible regional variation in the wage level and the level 
of job satisfaction reported by workers. 
 
4. Estimation results 
 
4.1. Basic results 
 
The wage equation is estimated with OLS with the logarithm of wage, WAGE, as the 
dependent variable (Table 1, Column 1). Wage is explained with typical human 
capital variables, work history variables, job characteristics, firm characteristics, and 
job disamenities. We concentrate here on the working conditions and discuss the other 
results very briefly. The results show some empirical evidence for compensating wage 
differentials arising from uncomfortable working hours. Workers that are engaged in 
3-shift work get around 19% higher hourly wages. This particular finding is not 
surprising as such, because higher wages for the 3-shift workers are stipulated in the 
binding collective labour agreements. In addition, those workers that work mostly 
outdoors get around 13% higher hourly wages in compensation for their adverse 
working conditions. However, there fails to be empirical evidence for the existence of 
compensating wage differentials arising from various perceived harms and hazards.  
 
=== TABLE 1 HERE === 
 
There are some explanatory variables included to capture adverse working conditions 
that are wrong-signed. This has actually been a typical finding in the literature on 
compensating wage differentials (see e.g. Brown 1980). For instance, workers with no 
voice at their workplace (i.e. they cannot influence their work) suffer from lower 
wages. In addition, workers located at workplaces in which there is at least one 
negative aspect in the work atmosphere have lower wages. The theory of 
compensating wage differentials predicts exactly the opposite. All in all, the results 
support the perspective that working conditions have a very minor role in the 
determination of individual wages in the Finnish labour market. There seem to be no 
pecuniary rewards for adverse working conditions.  
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We briefly summarize the results on the control variables included in the wage 
equation. In broad terms, the coefficients get the expected signs and they are in line 
with the literature. Females get around 19% lower hourly wages. Both age and 
educational level increase wages. What is more puzzling is the existence of 
substantial union premium despite the high rate of trade union density (around 80% of 
the salaried labour force). Workers suffer substantial wage losses from being 
unemployed during the previous five years. The largest effects arise from being 
unemployed over 25 months. These effects are in line with the empirical evidence on 
job displacements (see e.g. Kletzer 1998). Tenure yields decreasing returns. The 
estimated peak in the wage profile in terms of tenure is at around sixteen years of 
service in the same company. Workers with temporary contracts get lower wages, but 
this pattern fails to extend to part-time workers. The use of computers does not yield a 
wage premium. There is some evidence that workers that have recently participated in 
on-the-job-training get higher wages. Managers enjoy higher wages. Wages are not 
lower in the public sector or in foreign-owned companies, other things being equal. 
However, wages are substantially higher in large plants, which is in line with a well-
known stylized fact of the literature (see e.g. Oi and Idson 1999). There is some 
evidence for the so-called wage curve, as documented by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1995). In other words, wages seem to be lower in regions with high unemployment. 
The pattern that wages are lower in regions with high regional unemployment is 
exactly opposite to the prediction of compensating wage differentials that would 
imply that wages are higher in regions with high unemployment for compensating 
workers for the higher average risk to become an unemployed person in those 
particular labour markets. 
 
Clearly the results speak against compensating wage differentials. Workers’ inherent 
aspirations for higher wages in adverse working conditions are not transformed into 
higher actual wages in the labour market. A possible reason for this is the high 
unemployment rate (12.7 per cent in 1997, the year of our data), which constitutes an 
obstacle for the formation of compensating wage differentials by reducing the 
bargaining power of individual workers, thereby making it more likely that workers 
report lower levels of job satisfaction in jobs with adverse working conditions. 
Unemployment may also reduce overall opportunities for improving job satisfaction 
through job changes.6 
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The job dissatisfaction equation is estimated with ordered Probit. To account for the 
possible endogeneity of wage, we use the fitted wage as an explanatory variable and 
exclude the work history variables (OVER1PROFS, SWITCHES, UMOS1-UMOS4) 
from the job dissatisfaction equation. The results reveal that adverse working 
conditions substantially increase the level of job dissatisfaction reported by workers 
(Table 2, Column 1). Not having enough breaks, strongly experiencing at least one 
kind of harm or uncertainty, lack of voice, feel of neglect, bad atmosphere, mentally 
or physically heavy work, lack of promotion prospects and discrimination at the 
workplace all increase job dissatisfaction. Since the disamenity variables are either 
insignificant or wrong-signed in the wage equation, and, on the other hand, the fitted 
wage is not significant in the job satisfaction equation, there is no need to compare the 
coefficients directly in the way suggested in Section 2.  
 
=== TABLE 2 HERE === 
 
The job dissatisfaction equation reveals that the fitted wage has no impact on overall 
job satisfaction. Females report higher levels of job satisfaction. Older workers are 
also more satisfied. Singles are less satisfied, and workers whose spouse is working 
report lower levels of job satisfaction. Education has no significant effects. An 
increase in tenure eventually yields a decrease in the level of job dissatisfaction. The 
estimated peak in the job dissatisfaction profile in terms of tenure is at around eight 
years of service in the same company. The most likely explanation for this 
observation is that those workers that are dissatisfied with their matches gradually 
move away from the companies in which they are currently located (see e.g. Freeman 
1978). The 3-shift workers are more satisfied. In addition, workers performing a great 
deal of paid overtime are more satisfied. The reason for this is most likely that those 
particular workers are more motivated and therefore more committed to their work. 
Workers with good health are more satisfied. There is no statistically significant 
variation in workers’ job satisfaction in terms of the size of a plant despite the fact 
that the level of job satisfaction is usually observed to be higher in small plants (see 
e.g. Clark 1996). However, workers located in companies with financial difficulties 
report lower levels of job satisfaction, which may be related to a perceived fear of job 
loss.  
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The equation estimated for the perception of unfairness of pay reveals that prime-age 
workers are more dissatisfied with their pay in comparison with the remuneration paid 
in other occupations. Workers that belong to trade unions are also more dissatisfied. 
The perception of unfairness of pay is more common for workers with temporary 
contracts. In addition, workers that perform a great deal of overtime are more 
dissatisfied despite the fact that there is a substantial overtime premium in the labour 
market.7 Workers located in foreign-owned companies are more satisfied. Workers 
that are employed in large plants are less dissatisfied with their pay in comparison 
with the remuneration paid in other occupations. In contrast, workers that are 
currently located in companies that face financial difficulties are more dissatisfied 
with their pay.  
 
4.2. Robustness of the reported results  
 
We start the discussion about robustness of the conclusions from various alternative 
specifications of the wage equation. We estimated the wage equation without the 
employer characteristics. This is motivated by the argument that, in competitive 
labour markets, employer characteristics, such as plant size, should not be statistically 
significant explanatory variables for individual wages (see e.g. Manning 2003). This 
particular specification of the wage equation is therefore more consistent with the 
theory of compensating wage differentials, which is based on the premise of 
competitive labour markets. The estimation (results not reported) yields essentially 
the same results concerning the insignificant role of adverse working conditions in the 
determination of individual wages in the Finnish labour market. Including both the 
employer characteristics and occupational dummies did not change the results either 
(Table 1, Column 2). 
 
Estimation results of the wage equation separately for females and males reveal that 
males who do not have enough opportunities for breaks at their workplace get around 
26% higher hourly wages, other things being equal (Appendix 3). However, there is 
definitely no empirical evidence for the corresponding compensating wage 
differentials for females. Otherwise, the results again show no signs of compensating 
differentials. 
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We also experimented with alternative definitions of the disamenity variables. In our 
basic definition of perceived harm and hazard dummies the variables are equal to one 
if the worker reports at least one adverse factor at the workplace (see Appendix 1). 
This definition of perceived harms and hazards can be made tighter by requiring that 
there must be at least three clearly adverse factors at the workplace. In this case the 
average values for the HARM and HAZARD variables are around 0.05, in 
comparison with the values 0.29 and 0.34, respectively, in the basic definition. 
However, using these new dummy variables does not change the earlier conclusion 
about the role of adverse working conditions in the determination of individual wages 
(results not reported). In addition, we did take a sum of the adverse job characteristics 
in the calculation of the HARM and HAZARD variables. In this specification of the 
wage equation, the coefficient for the HARM variable turned out to be positive at the 
10% significance level (not reported). Otherwise, the results remained the same.  
 
Instead of the continuous wage variable we used a self-reported categorical wage 
variable (WAGECAT) and estimated the model with interval regression (Table 1, 
Column 3). This gives a significant positive coefficient for night and shift work, 
whereas only shift work was significant for the continuous wage variable.8 Mentally 
heavy work and team work related problems also obtain positive and significant 
coefficients. Otherwise, there are no indications on compensation for working 
conditions. Some of the control variables such as MUCHCOMPUTER seem to obtain 
significance when the categorical wage variable is used. 
 
Next, we discuss some robustness tests for the job satisfaction model. Using the actual 
wage in the job satisfaction model estimated with ordered Probit gives very similar 
estimation results (not reported) as the model with the fitted wage. Using the “wage 
gap” (difference of actual and predicted wage) instead of the fitted wage in the job 
satisfaction model does not change the conclusions (not reported). Since there are 
relatively few observations in the highest job dissatisfaction categories, we also tried 
aggregating categories 3 and 4. This did not change the results (not reported). 
 
We also tried wage dissatisfaction as an alternative to overall job dissatisfaction. The 
main difference to the model with job satisfaction is that now perceived job hazards 
have a significant positive effect on the feeling of the unfairness of pay (Table 2, 
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Column 2). There are changes in the significance of some of the control variables, 
too. Replacing the fitted wage by actual wage in the PAYUNFAIR equation or 
aggregating categories 1 and 2 (highest satisfaction with wage) did not change the 
results (not reported). Moreover, using “wage gap” (difference between actual and 
predicted wage) instead of the fitted wage in the model for the unfairness of pay at the 
workplace does not change the conclusions (not reported). In addition, we did make 
some experiments with semi-nonparametric ordered Probit models (Stewart, 2004; 
results not reported). In the job dissatisfaction equation, the explanatory variables that 
capture adverse working conditions turned out to be statistically insignificant, 
although they did get the same signs as in the basic version of the equation. For the 
PAYUNFAIR equation, the results for the impact of adverse working conditions 
remained the same and also statistically significant.  
 
The failure to observe compensating wage differentials may be due to the selectivity 
of workers for particular workplaces. In this sense, working conditions self-reported 
by workers are at least partly chosen by those very same workers. At least, in 
principle, the impact of the selectivity of workers for their working conditions from 
the point of view of the estimates of compensating wage differentials can be evaluated 
by estimating models in which working conditions are in the first-stage of estimation 
explained by the personal background variables and the past labour market experience 
of workers by the use of Probit models. By taking into account the selectivity of 
workers for workplaces, individual hourly wages can, in the second-stage of 
estimation, be explained by the same variables as in Table 1.  
 
Experiments with Probit models indicate that there is a tendency that workers with 
more education, particular fields of education (business, law or social science) and 
workers with little work experience with their current employer have a smaller 
probability of self-reporting perceived harms and hazards at their workplaces (results 
not reported). The results provide some support for the argument that the OLS 
estimates for compensating wage differentials may be downwards biased. However, 
since we have a large set of variables that describe adverse working conditions, 
dealing with selectivity in many dimensions would be extremely difficult. For this 
reason, these conclusions should be regarded as tentative.  
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As a final robustness analysis we tested for compensating wage differentials by two 
alternative ways outlined in Section 2. That is, we estimated two job dissatisfaction 
equations where, in the first one, only the wage (and control variables) were included, 
but no work disamenities, and, in the second, work disamenities (and control 
variables) were included, but no wage (not reported). The same was repeated for wage 
dissatisfaction. The estimation of the job dissatisfaction equation (or pay 
dissatisfaction equation) without the variables that capture adverse working 
conditions revealed that wage is not a statistically significant explanatory variable. 
The result supports the hypothesis of compensating differentials, since insignificance 
of the wage would follow from full wage compensation. On the other hand, the 
estimation of the job dissatisfaction model (or pay dissatisfaction model) without 
wage showed that work disamenities were still significant. This contradicts the 
hypothesis of compensating differentials. This is not surprising as such, because the 
fitted wage is not a statistically significant explanatory variable for the level of job 
dissatisfaction (Table 2). 
 
These results point out that it is unlikely that reliable inferences on the hypothesis of 
compensating wage differentials can be drawn from these tests. At least, if one has 
data available on utility (or rather, proxies for it), wage, and work conditions, it is 
advisable to use all of them. In our case, it is clear that the conflicting conclusions are 
at least partly caused by the result that wage does not seem to be related to job 
satisfaction.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This study investigated the role of adverse working conditions in the determination of 
individual wages and the level of overall job satisfaction in the Finnish labour market. 
The potential influence of adverse working conditions on self-reported fairness of pay 
was considered as an alternative, indirect measure for job satisfaction.  
 
Our reading of the evidence is that working conditions have a very minor role in the 
determination of individual wages in the labour market. In contrast, adverse working 
conditions substantially increase the level of job dissatisfaction and the perception of 
unfairness of pay at the workplace.  
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Table 1. Estimation results for the wage equations.  
 
 Ln(WAGE), 
OLS 
Ln(WAGE), 
OLS 
WAGECAT, 
Interval 
regression 
FEMALE -0.194 -0.165 -0.199 
 (4.16)*** (3.27)*** (9.62)*** 
AGE_2 0.615 0.612 0.329 
 (6.35)*** (6.34)*** (7.89)*** 
AGE_3 0.799 0.803 0.416 
 (7.80)*** (7.88)*** (9.43)*** 
UNION 0.267 0.298 0.083 
 (4.82)*** (5.39)*** (3.57)*** 
SINGLE -0.079 -0.079 -0.080 
 (1.29) (1.29) (3.11)*** 
SPOUSEWORK 0.063 0.045 0.013 
 (1.63) (1.18) (0.77) 
CHILDREN -0.010 -0.008 0.002 
 (0.82) (0.69) (0.45) 
EDU_2 0.135 0.110 0.093 
 (2.18)** (1.72)* (3.56)*** 
EDU_3 0.314 0.295 0.345 
 (3.64)*** (3.20)*** (10.22)*** 
EDU_4 0.514 0.453 0.518 
 (5.53)*** (4.39)*** (14.10)*** 
EDUHUM 0.006 -0.063 0.019 
 (0.06) (0.56) (0.52) 
EDUBUS 0.099 0.076 0.092 
 (1.52) (1.03) (3.59)*** 
EDUTECH 0.028 0.010 -0.007 
 (0.43) (0.14) (0.26) 
EDUCARE 0.159 -0.002 0.100 
 (1.87)* (0.02) (2.98)*** 
OVER1PROFS -0.046 -0.048 -0.024 
 (1.35) (1.42) (1.70)* 
SWITCHES 0.014 0.011 0.015 
 (0.96) (0.74) (2.85)*** 
UMOS1 0.090 0.079 -0.038 
 (1.71)* (1.46) (1.58) 
UMOS2 -0.001 0.009 -0.073 
 (0.01) (0.10) (2.14)** 
UMOS3 -0.337 -0.342 -0.061 
 (3.14)*** (3.18)*** (1.71)* 
UMOS4 -0.890 -0.874 -0.086 
 (6.22)*** (6.21)*** (1.63) 
TENURE 0.064 0.067 0.012 
 (8.83)*** (9.13)*** (3.80)*** 
TENURE2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 
 (8.02)*** (8.39)*** (2.89)*** 
SECONDJOB 0.140 0.121 -0.049 
 (1.37) (1.15) (1.10) 
FIXEDPAY 0.006 0.016 -0.075 
 (0.10) (0.29) (2.96)*** 
PIECERATE -0.135 -0.107 -0.102 
 (0.88) (0.68) (1.52) 
TEMPORARY -0.533 -0.512 -0.093 
 (6.87)*** (6.53)*** (3.19)*** 
PART_TIME 0.055 0.058 -0.537 
 (0.66) (0.68) (8.26)*** 
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NIGHT 0.122 0.166 0.177 
 (0.87) (1.14) (2.74)*** 
SHIFT 0.194 0.132 0.223 
 (2.51)** (1.60) (6.25)*** 
WEEKEND 0.430 0.497 -0.945 
 (0.79) (0.89) (3.76)*** 
MUCHOVERTIME -0.081 -0.062 0.064 
 (0.87) (0.70) (1.77)* 
NOBREAKS -0.001 -0.025 -0.005 
 (0.02) (0.43) (0.19) 
OUTDOORS 0.129 0.148 -0.051 
 (1.75)* (1.91)* (1.37) 
HARM 0.018 0.016 -0.001 
 (0.44) (0.41) (0.04) 
HAZARD 0.014 0.025 0.021 
 (0.35) (0.66) (1.31) 
UNCERTAINTY 0.004 -0.005 0.014 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.90) 
NOVOICE -0.073 -0.078 -0.064 
 (1.89)* (2.06)** (4.07)*** 
NEGLECT -0.040 -0.022 -0.047 
 (0.84) (0.49) (2.35)** 
ATMOSPHERE -0.196 -0.169 -0.033 
 (3.03)*** (2.61)*** (1.25) 
CONFLICTS 0.033 0.056 0.027 
 (0.49) (0.87) (0.95) 
HEAVYPHYSIC 0.055 0.091 -0.034 
 (0.71) (1.19) (0.91) 
HEAVYMENTAL 0.004 -0.023 0.043 
 (0.06) (0.34) (1.68)* 
MUCHCOMPUTER 0.046 0.060 0.043 
 (0.84) (1.06) (2.07)** 
DAYSTRAINING 0.006 0.007 0.004 
 (1.64) (1.92)* (2.45)** 
NOPROMOTION 0.020 0.022 -0.022 
 (0.50) (0.58) (1.44) 
DISCRIMINATION 0.049 0.035 0.007 
 (1.36) (0.98) (0.48) 
HIGHTEAM -0.024 -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.61) (0.02) (0.61) 
TEAMPROBLEM 0.011 0.026 0.034 
 (0.29) (0.72) (2.22)** 
MANAGER 0.080 0.076 0.107 
 (2.09)** (1.98)** (6.72)*** 
SICKABSENCE 0.007 0.006 -0.011 
 (0.50) (0.42) (1.34) 
CONDITION -0.001 0.001 0.011 
 (0.07) (0.08) (2.03)** 
PUBLIC -0.054 -0.050 -0.008 
 (0.84) (0.78) (0.32) 
FIRMFOREIGN 0.039 0.000 0.091 
 (0.54) (0.01) (3.42)*** 
PSIZE2 0.136 0.114 0.113 
 (2.90)*** (2.41)** (5.86)*** 
PSIZE3 0.157 0.139 0.131 
 (2.99)*** (2.64)*** (6.25)*** 
PSIZE4 0.232 0.209 0.171 
 (3.66)*** (3.14)*** (6.18)*** 
EMPGROWTH 0.076 0.064 0.035 
 (1.43) (1.18) (1.70)* 
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FIRMUNSTABLE -0.072 -0.086 -0.037 
 (1.43) (1.76)* (1.79)* 
FEMSHARE 0.049 0.059 -0.046 
 (1.02) (1.16) (2.29)** 
UN -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
 (1.73)* (1.71)* (4.17)*** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation dummies No Yes No 
Observations 2801 2801 2801 
R-squared 0.41 0.46  
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 2. Estimation results for the dissatisfaction equations. 
 DISSATISFACTION,  
Ordered Probit 
PAYUNFAIR,  
Ordered Probit 
FITTED WAGE 0.076 0.015 
 (1.02) (0.17) 
FEMALE -0.154 0.024 
 (2.26)** (0.37) 
AGE_2 -0.220 0.216 
 (2.04)** (2.10)** 
AGE_3 -0.298 0.123 
 (2.43)** (1.05) 
UNION 0.028 0.165 
 (0.41) (2.57)** 
SINGLE 0.152 0.055 
 (1.97)** (0.75) 
SPOUSEWORK 0.137 -0.003 
 (2.43)** (0.05) 
CHILDREN -0.021 -0.007 
 (1.10) (0.38) 
EDU_2 0.066 0.054 
 (0.79) (0.71) 
EDU_3 0.084 0.030 
 (0.71) (0.26) 
EDU_4 0.071 0.000 
 (0.52) (0.00) 
EDUHUM 0.103 -0.022 
 (0.81) (0.18) 
EDUBUS -0.023 -0.013 
 (0.27) (0.17) 
EDUTECH 0.040 0.004 
 (0.47) (0.05) 
EDUCARE 0.023 -0.073 
 (0.20) (0.67) 
TENURE 0.017 0.000 
 (1.58) (0.02) 
TENURE2 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.88)* (0.46) 
SECONDJOB 0.010 0.039 
 (0.07) (0.34) 
FIXEDPAY -0.009 0.050 
 (0.12) (0.73) 
PIECERATE -0.117 -0.114 
 (0.73) (0.71) 
TEMPORARY -0.045 0.223 
 (0.47) (2.35)** 
PART_TIME 0.106 0.016 
 (1.08) (0.20) 
NIGHT 0.045 -0.064 
 (0.15) (0.26) 
SHIFT -0.225 -0.161 
 (1.94)* (1.47) 
WEEKEND -0.422 0.265 
 (1.05) (0.60) 
MUCHOVERTIME -0.283 0.240 
 (2.49)** (2.27)** 
NOBREAKS 0.178 0.317 
 (2.10)** (3.83)*** 
OUTDOORS 0.159 0.168 
 (1.44) (1.63) 
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HARM 0.208 0.215 
 (3.59)*** (3.74)*** 
HAZARD 0.032 0.134 
 (0.58) (2.52)** 
UNCERTAINTY 0.175 0.053 
 (3.43)*** (1.11) 
NOVOICE 0.100 -0.070 
 (1.83)* (1.37) 
NEGLECT 0.275 0.181 
 (4.23)*** (3.03)*** 
ATMOSPHERE 0.219 0.029 
 (2.43)** (0.33) 
CONFLICTS 0.096 0.014 
 (0.87) (0.14) 
HEAVYPHYSIC 0.260 0.239 
 (2.15)** (2.00)** 
HEAVYMENTAL 0.259 0.154 
 (2.29)** (1.52) 
MUCHCOMPUTER 0.016 -0.173 
 (0.20) (2.55)** 
DAYSTRAINING -0.009 0.002 
 (2.00)** (0.56) 
NOPROMOTION 0.292 0.145 
 (5.36)*** (3.05)*** 
DISCRIMINATION 0.318 0.290 
 (5.89)*** (5.67)*** 
HIGHTEAM -0.043 -0.013 
 (0.76) (0.25) 
TEAMPROBLEM -0.025 -0.022 
 (0.47) (0.45) 
MANAGER -0.032 -0.044 
 (0.57) (0.82) 
SICKABSENCE -0.001 0.025 
 (0.05) (1.31) 
CONDITION -0.108 -0.004 
 (5.39)*** (0.23) 
PUBLIC -0.124 0.126 
 (1.37) (1.52) 
FIRMFOREIGN 0.078 -0.150 
 (0.87) (1.68)* 
PSIZE2 0.021 -0.034 
 (0.33) (0.58) 
PSIZE3 -0.010 -0.133 
 (0.14) (2.04)** 
PSIZE4 -0.030 -0.247 
 (0.28) (2.49)** 
EMPGROWTH -0.122 0.020 
 (1.51) (0.27) 
FIRMUNSTABLE 0.178 0.197 
 (2.52)** (3.05)*** 
FEMSHARE 0.042 -0.013 
 (0.63) (0.21) 
UN -0.006 -0.000 
 (1.09) (0.01) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Occupation dummies No No 
Observations 2745 2734 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
The fitted wage is obtained from the wage equation that is reported in the second column in Table 1.  
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Appendix 1. Definitions of the variables. 
 
Variable Definition/measurement  
  
Dependent variables:  
  
WAGE Logarithm of hourly earnings that is calculated based on the annual earnings (FIM) obtained from tax 
registers and by using regular weekly hours from LFS. 
  
WAGECAT Logarithm of the self-reported monthly wage groups (19 groups). Logarithm is taken from the lower limit 
of wage groups. 
  
DISSATISFACTION Dissatisfaction with current job, measured in four categories. Higher values mean that worker is more 
dissatisfied. 
  
PAYUNFAIR Notion about the fairness of pay in comparison with the remuneration paid in other occupations. Measured in 
five categories. Higher values mean an increase in the perception of unfairness. 
  
Personal background characteristics: 
  
FEMALE 1 = female, 0 = male 
AGE_1 Age  between 15-24  = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
AGE_2 Age  between 25-44 = 1, otherwise = 0 
AGE_3 Age  between 45-64 = 1, otherwise = 0  
UNION Member of trade union = 1, otherwise = 0 
SINGLE Not married=1, otherwise=0 
SPOUSEWORK Spouse is working = 1, otherwise = 0 
CHILDREN The number of children under 18 living at home 
EDU_1 Comprehensive education = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
EDU_2 Upper secondary or vocational education = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDU_3 Polytechnic or lower university degree = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDU_4 Higher university degree = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDUHUM Field of education is humanities or teachers’ education = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDUBUS Field of education is business, law or social science = 1, otherwise = 0  
EDUTECH Field of education is technical, natural science or computer science = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDUCARE Field of education is health care, social work, etc. = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Past labour market experience: 
  
OVER1PROFS Has been in more than one distinctly different kind of occupations during his/her life = 1, otherwise = 0 
SWITCHES Number of job switches during the past five years 
UMOS_1 Number of unemployment months during the past five years 1-6 = 1, otherwise = 0 
UMOS_2 Number of unemployment months during the past five years 7-12 = 1, otherwise = 0 
UMOS_3 Number of unemployment months during the past five years 13-24 = 1, otherwise = 0 
UMOS_4 Number of unemployment months during the past five years  25 or more = 1, otherwise = 0 
TENURE Number of years in the current firm 
TENURE2 TENURE squared 
SECONDJOB Has a second job = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Payment systems: 
  
FIXEDPAY Fixed monthly or hourly pay (including shift work supplement) = 1, otherwise = 0 
PIECERATE Payment system is based on only piece-work or commission pay = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Working time: 
  
TEMPORARY Fixed-term employment relationship = 1, otherwise = 0 
PART_TIME Part-time work = 1, otherwise = 0 
NIGHT Night work = 1, otherwise = 0 
SHIFT Uninterrupted 3-shift work = 1, otherwise  = 0 
WEEKEND Has weekend work = 1, otherwise = 0 
MUCHOVERTIME Does almost daily overtime for which receives compensation = 1, otherwise = 0 
 
Working conditions: 
  
NOBREAKS Can take breaks or rest periods ‘far too seldom’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
OUTDOORS Does principally outdoor work = 1, otherwise = 0 
HARM  At least one adverse factor that affects work ‘very much’ (includes heat, cold, vibration, draught, noise, 
smoke, gas and fumes, humidity, dry indoor air, dusts, dirtiness of work environment, poor or glaring 
lightning, irritating or corrosive substances, restless work environment, repetitive, monotonous movements, 
difficult or uncomfortable working positions, time pressure and tight time schedules, heavy lifting, lack of 
space, mildew in buildings) = 1, otherwise = 0 
HAZARD At least one factor is experienced as ‘a distinct hazard’ (includes accident risk, becoming subject to physical 
violence, hazards caused by chemical substances, radiation hazard, major catastrophe hazard, hazard of 
infectious diseases, hazard of skin diseases, cancer risk, risk of strain injuries, risk of succumbing to mental 
disturbance, risk of grave work exhaustion, risk of causing serious injury to others, risk of causing serious 
damage to valuable equipment or product) = 1, otherwise = 0 
UNCERTAINTY Work carries at least one insecurity factor (includes transfer to other duties, threat of temporary dismissal, 
threat of permanent dismissal, threat of unemployment, threat of becoming incapable of work, unforeseen 
changes) = 1, otherwise = 0 
NOVOICE ‘Not at all’ able to influence at least one factor in work (includes contents of tasks, order in which tasks are 
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done, pace of work, working methods, division of tasks between employees, choice of working partners, 
equipment purchases) = 1, otherwise = 0 
NEGLECT At least one supportive factor ‘never’ experienced in work (includes advice or help, support and 
encouragement from superiors, support and encouragement from co-workers, feel of being valued member of 
work community, opportunity to plan work, opportunity to apply own ideas in work, feel of own work as 
productive and useful) = 1, otherwise = 0 
ATMOSPHERE Experiences at least one negative aspect of work atmosphere ‘daily or almost daily’ or positive aspect ‘never’ 
(includes negative aspects conflicts or argument with someone else in work community or with a customer, 
being subject or threatened by physical violence, use of unfriendly words or gestures by co-workers or 
superiors, and positive aspects praise for work from co-workers or customers, opportunities for learning new 
things and developing in one’s occupation) = 1, otherwise = 0 
CONFLICTS At least one type of conflict appears in work unit ‘a lot’ (includes competitive spirit, conflicts between 
superiors and subordinates, conflicts between employees, conflicts between employee groups) = 1, otherwise 
= 0 
HEAVYPHYSIC Current tasks physically ‘very demanding’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
HEAVYMENTAL Current tasks mentally ‘very demanding’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Use of computers: 
  
MUCHCOMPUTER Individual uses computer most of the working day = 1, otherwise 0 
  
Training, promotion, and discrimination: 
  
DAYSTRAINING Number of days attended courses while being paid by employer during the last 12 months  
NOPROMOTION Advancement opportunities in current workplace ‘poor’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
DISCRIMINATION Has fallen subject to at least one type of unequal treatment or discrimination in current workplace (includes 
time of hiring, remuneration, career advancement opportunities, access to training arranged by employer, 
receiving information, attitudes of co-workers or superiors) = 1, otherwise = 0  
  
Work organization: 
  
HIGHTEAM Works in teams ‘almost all the time’ or ‘about three quarters of the time’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
TEAMPROBLEM There is at least one problematic aspect in the work group (includes ‘totally untrue’ that group selects its 
leader, group decides about division of responsibilities, productiveness of work improves in group work, or 
work pressure becomes evenly distributed, and ‘totally true’ that group work causes conflicts) = 1, otherwise = 
0 
MANAGER Tasks involve supervision of work of others or delegation of tasks = 1, otherwise = 0 
 
Health and absenteeism: 
  
SICKABSENCE Number of absences from work due to illness in the last 6 months 
CONDITION Self-assessment of working capacity. The variable is scaled from 0 (total inability to work) to 10 (top working 
capacity)  
  
Information about employer: 
  
PUBLIC  Employer is state or municipality = 1, otherwise  = 0 
FIRMFOREIGN Employer is private, mainly foreign-owned enterprise = 1, otherwise = 0 
PSIZE_1 Size of plant under 10 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
PSIZE_2 Size of plant 10-49 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
PSIZE_3 Size of plant 50-499 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
PSIZE_4 Size of plant over 499 employees = 1, otherwise = 0  
EMPGROWTH The number of employees has increased in the plant during the past three years = 1, otherwise = 0 
FIRMUNSTABLE Financial situation is ‘unstable’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
FEMSHARE Share of females in the company is ‘high’ = 1, otherwise  = 0 
  
Regional variable:  
  
UN The regional unemployment rate based on 21 NUTS3-regions (Source: LFS by Statistics Finland). 
  
Industry and occupation: 
  
Industries  14 industry dummies based on Standard Industry Classification by Statistics Finland 
Occupations  81 occupation dummies based on the classification of occupations by Statistics Finland 
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
  
FEMALE 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
AGE_2 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
AGE_3 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
UNION 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
  
SINGLE 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
SPOUSEWORK 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
CHILDREN 0.86 1.37 0.00 18.00
EDU_2 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
EDU_3 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
  
EDU_4 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
EDUHUM 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
EDUBUS 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
EDUTECH 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
EDUCARE 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
  
OVER1PROFS 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
SWITCHES 0.74 1.64 0.00 30.00
UMOS1 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
UMOS2 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
UMOS3 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
  
UMOS4 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00
TENURE 9.54 9.29 0.00 47.00
SECONDJOB 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
FIXEDPAY 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00
  
PIECERATE 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00
TEMPORARY 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
PART_TIME 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
NIGHT 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
SHIFT 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
  
WEEKEND 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
MUCHOVERTIME 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
NOBREAKS 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
OUTDOORS 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
  
HARM 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
HAZARD 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
UNCERTAINTY 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
NOVOICE 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
NEGLECT 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
  
ATMOSPHERE 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
CONFLICTS 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
HEAVYPHYSIC 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
HEAVYMENTAL 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
MUCHCOMPUTER 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
 31
  
DAYSTRAINING 2.75 5.56 0.00 60.00
NOPROMOTION 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00
DISCRIMINATION 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
HIGHTEAM 0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00
TEAMPROBLEM 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
  
MANAGER 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
SICKABSENCE 0.65 1.17 0.00 17.00
CONDITION 8.62 1.37 0.00 10.00
PUBLIC 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
FIRMFOREIGN 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
  
PSIZE2 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
PSIZE3 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
PSIZE4 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
EMPGROWTH 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
FIRMUNSTABLE 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
  
FEMSHARE 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
UN 17.08 4.74 11.80 29.30
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Appendix 3. Estimation of wage equation separately for females and males. 
 
 Ln(WAGE), 
OLS for 
females 
Ln(WAGE), 
OLS for males 
AGE_2 0.463 0.710 
 (3.52)*** (5.06)*** 
AGE_3 0.664 0.813 
 (4.81)*** (5.43)*** 
UNION 0.269 0.284 
 (3.41)*** (3.69)*** 
SINGLE 0.018 -0.105 
 (0.21) (1.15) 
SPOUSEWORK 0.022 0.133 
 (0.41) (2.47)** 
CHILDREN -0.057 0.048 
 (2.83)*** (2.64)*** 
EDU_2 0.212 0.017 
 (2.66)*** (0.17) 
EDU_3 0.368 0.164 
 (3.26)*** (1.15) 
EDU_4 0.681 0.299 
 (5.47)*** (2.07)** 
EDUHUM 0.093 -0.134 
 (0.85) (0.64) 
EDUBUS 0.082 0.157 
 (1.05) (1.21) 
EDUTECH -0.051 0.068 
 (0.53) (0.69) 
EDUCARE 0.084 0.460 
 (0.88) (2.34)** 
OVER1PROFS -0.077 -0.011 
 (1.59) (0.23) 
SWITCHES -0.001 0.018 
 (0.04) (1.19) 
UMOS1 0.147 0.011 
 (2.03)** (0.15) 
UMOS2 0.028 -0.006 
 (0.20) (0.06) 
UMOS3 -0.255 -0.477 
 (1.59) (3.37)*** 
UMOS4 -1.052 -0.751 
 (5.13)*** (3.95)*** 
TENURE 0.076 0.049 
 (6.79)*** (5.15)*** 
TENURE2 -0.002 -0.001 
 (5.96)*** (4.67)*** 
SECONDJOB 0.340 -0.018 
 (2.72)*** (0.13) 
FIXEDPAY -0.022 0.004 
 (0.27) (0.05) 
PIECERATE 0.057 -0.166 
 (0.23) (0.92) 
TEMPORARY -0.384 -0.695 
 (3.82)*** (5.79)*** 
PART_TIME 0.204 -0.300 
 (2.13)** (1.89)* 
NIGHT 0.070 0.340 
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 (0.36) (2.00)** 
SHIFT 0.193 0.170 
 (1.73)* (1.59) 
WEEKEND 0.671 -1.058 
 (1.60) (0.92) 
MUCHOVERTIME -0.054 -0.207 
 (0.39) (1.60) 
NOBREAKS -0.062 0.261 
 (0.86) (3.24)*** 
OUTDOORS 0.212 0.089 
 (1.22) (1.14) 
HARM 0.017 -0.005 
 (0.32) (0.09) 
HAZARD 0.004 0.015 
 (0.09) (0.25) 
UNCERTAINTY 0.014 -0.035 
 (0.29) (0.68) 
NOVOICE -0.073 -0.048 
 (1.42) (0.84) 
NEGLECT -0.093 -0.036 
 (1.43) (0.53) 
ATMOSPHERE -0.277 -0.075 
 (2.83)*** (0.99) 
CONFLICTS 0.064 0.050 
 (0.74) (0.44) 
HEAVYPHYSIC -0.033 0.124 
 (0.28) (1.43) 
HEAVYMENTAL -0.035 0.049 
 (0.37) (0.56) 
MUCHCOMPUTER 0.103 -0.005 
 (1.49) (0.06) 
DAYSTRAINING 0.006 0.006 
 (1.18) (1.31) 
NOPROMOTION 0.038 0.002 
 (0.68) (0.03) 
DISCRIMINATION 0.013 0.080 
 (0.25) (1.54) 
HIGHTEAM -0.008 -0.052 
 (0.15) (0.95) 
TEAMPROBLEM -0.003 0.048 
 (0.05) (0.92) 
MANAGER 0.070 0.108 
 (1.35) (1.95)* 
SICKABSENCE 0.030 -0.016 
 (1.40) (0.86) 
CONDITION 0.030 -0.031 
 (1.69)* (1.84)* 
PUBLIC 0.024 -0.142 
 (0.31) (1.43) 
FIRMFOREIGN 0.141 -0.021 
 (1.23) (0.23) 
PSIZE2 0.114 0.094 
 (1.88)* (1.30) 
PSIZE3 0.124 0.142 
 (1.77)* (1.77)* 
PSIZE4 0.209 0.174 
 (2.34)** (1.92)* 
EMPGROWTH 0.012 0.153 
 (0.15) (2.09)** 
FIRMUNSTABLE -0.072 -0.051 
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 (1.15) (0.63) 
FEMSHARE 0.059 0.035 
 (1.04) (0.37) 
UN -0.003 -0.010 
 (0.61) (1.78)* 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Occupation dummies No No 
Observations 1488 1313 
R-squared 0.40 0.49 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Notes 
 
1 Unfortunately, the data that we are using does not contain obvious instruments to handle the issue of 
potential endogeneity of working conditions. Therefore, we focus on the investigation of the robustness 
of the reported results, instead. 
 
2 Van Praag and Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2004) summarize the literature on satisfaction. 
 
 
3 Duncan and Holmlund (1983) discover empirical evidence for the existence of compensating wage 
differentials in Sweden, which has somewhat similar labour market institutions to Finland’s. 
 
4 We could assume that utility depends on consumption, which, in turn, depends on wage, but this 
generalisation is not essential here. 
 
5 The QWLS survey does not include information on actual accidents in the firms.  
 
6 Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2003) document that plant-level worker turnover is strongly procyclical in 
Finland. 
 
7 The (minimum) premium for daily overtime is 50% for the first two hours and 100% for each 
following hour in Finland. The premium for weekly overtime is 50%, irrespective of the number of 
hours. 
 
8 The results from the interval regression (Table 1, Column 3) give a negative coefficient for weekend 
work. This is not an important result, because the number of workers that are engaged in weekend work 
is eight in the data.  
